White Paper

Impediments to U.S. Educational & Public Institutions Ameliorating the Mass Shooting Epidemic with Effective State-of-the-Art Security Solutions
&
The Introduction of a *School Access-Control Vulnerability Index, (S.A.V.I™)* Audit and Certification Process, As a Solution

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Executive Summary

The Sandy Hook Elementary School mass shootings, in Newtown, Connecticut, created a watershed moment in the U.S. whereby public opinion finally demanded that a solution be found to this seemingly accelerating problem. After much public outcry and time has gone by, progress had been slow, in making schools less susceptible to attack by active shooters. We have seen an escalation in tragic school shootings with horrific double-digit casualties, in California, Minnesota, Virginia, Illinois, Connecticut, Oregon, Kentucky, and most recently Parkland Florida.

Unlike the reaction to 9/11, whereby a centralized, national, body of action, namely the Transportation Security Administration, was formed to address the problem, no such entity has been established. As a result, the enhancement of security and access control measures in schools across America, primarily at the K-12 level, has been disorganized, decentralized, inefficient and largely an assortment of methods and approaches, ranging from effective, to totally ineffective in performance.

The ability of the educational administrative community to secure adequate, objective advice and counsel on how to address the mass shooting crisis, from the current configuration of the security industry, has been compromised by several factors. First of all, there has been a large duplication of effort, with thousands of school districts across the country acting locally in trying to secure knowledge and expertise in security. Additionally, there is no single certified body of specialized, education sector security professionals in existence, that can be assured in supplying education officials with objective, accurate, unbiased and above all, cost-effective guidance in ameliorating the mass shooting threat at their schools. Finally, there is no universally accepted process for auditing a school facility for security vulnerability and no quantitative measurement tool to be utilized in conducting that audit.

This paper outlines the need for a national school security association or body to be created, as well as the unification of the security industry, in creating a comprehensive process and clearing house for expertise to be constructively applied to the school active shooter problem.

This white paper launches the creation of the School Access-Control Vulnerability Index™ (S.A.V.I.), Audit and Dealer Certification process. The

index measures the presence, or lack thereof, of specialized systems and structures aimed at severely limiting the possibility of an active shooter gaining access to a school. The index brings together input from a variety of general and school security experts from across the U.S.

The S.A.V.I. index can be used to administer the S.A.V.I. Audit process, whereby the school facility is quantitatively scored on how susceptible the facility would be to a mass shooting attack. The audit measures the efficacy of how well the total group of security systems and structures work together in blocking access to the school, by an unwanted intruder.

A dedicated school security body or association would be responsible for evaluating how well the proposed S.A.V.I. security systems outline stands up to real-world experience and, subsequently evolve or modify the model, as needed. The school security association would also construct a Dealer Certification Process, whereby security integrators would be trained and certified on how to audit facilities and install required, cost-effective, specialized, approved school-specific security measures.

Finally, the process would also provide the insurance industry with a quantitative, measurable manner to be able to evaluate the risk of attack at a facility and show that schools have taken all reasonable measures to mitigate security risks, thereby making them eligible for insurance premium discounts.

Vision

"Over the last thirty years, school shootings have gone from a rare occurrence to a frequent tragedy… from 1969 to 1978, there were 16 school shootings in the United States, from 1979 to 1988, there were 29, almost double the previous decade; near-doubling again from 1989 to 1999, and again from 1999 to 2009…yet even as they become more common—these cases are persistently viewed as "aberrations" with each new incident provok(ing) surprise and shock,"[i] as one prominent author was quoted as saying. "Since 1980, there have been a total of 137 fatal school shootings that killed 297 victims. Elementary schools saw the fewest shootings (17), while high schools saw the most (62)."[ii] On December 14, 2012, 20-year-old Adam Lanza fatally shot twenty children and six adult staff members in a mass murder at Sandy Hook Elementary School in the village of Sandy Hook in Newtown, Connecticut. At the time, this seemed to be a tipping point in US public opinion regarding the need to take some tangible action to prevent, or at least limit, the scope and recurring nature of these mass killings. School shootings like Parkland and Sandy Hook, etc., and other mass shootings at other public venues, such as those in Nevada, Florida and Colorado, seemed to gain instantaneous momentum and give newfound hope that elected and school officials across the country, would take some much-needed and overdue action in addressing this chronic, worsening problem

Almost immediately after the school tragedies, the gun control debate was reborn in the US. Groups on each side, the NRA (National Rifle Association), the President(s), the Republican and Democratic Parties, School Officials, law enforcement leaders all assumed their traditional positions and posturing. Do we limit assault rifles? Should the availability of high-capacity ammunition magazines be limited? Maybe background checks should be augmented? The event that should have brought the country together to act with a unified voice, to tackle the issue, instead divided the respective constituents and the net result was that there was very little progress in addressing the school mass shooting problem.

Concurrent with the gun-control debate, the public discussion also turned to mental health treatment in the U.S., not being adequate. The argument was that guns were not the problem, but guns in the hands of mentally unstable people were the root cause of the mass shooting problem. With the economic downturn and the commensurate reduction of public budget money dedicated

to the treatment of the mentally ill, the trend is not promising that all people in need, with a proclivity toward becoming a mass shooting assailant, will be effectively cured.

So in light of the fact that the two major directions that the discussion in the U.S. took, along with subsets of these areas, such as ideas like supplying teachers with guns, etc., the drive to provide real, practical solutions and action to this inexorable problem, has dramatically declined. The vision for this white paper is to spur the country back into concrete, measurable, substantive *action* in considerably reducing the frequency and magnitude of mass shooting episodes in schools and susceptible public venues.

We propose to do this, not by attempting to solve the politically charged and ultra-complex, root causes of these incidents: i.e., gun control and mental health treatment, because we may never address these areas enough to make a sizable reduction in school shootings. Instead, the most expedient method of reducing the frequency and severity of these events is to treat the symptom rather than the cause.

What has been the symptom in all school shootings?
In all of these events an assailant or assailants has/have gained access into a school, either forcibly or routinely, with a considerable amount of weapons and ammunition and has/have continued to have access, visually and by passage, for a reasonable duration of time, in order to kill or injure as many victims as possible, before being apprehended or taking their own lives. All of these school shootings could have been stopped or severely limited by: **Controlling initial and continued access into the school, with weapons and ammunition.** This action will not totally eliminate school mass shootings, but utilizing currently available, state-of-the-art security technology, most of the events we have seen in the past could have either been severely curtailed or totally prevented.

The purpose of this paper is to identify impediments to U.S. schools being able to adequately address the mass shooting problem with effective state-of-the-art security solutions and outlining the case for implementing a standardized security approach toward measuring the vulnerability of schools to attack and subsequently applying security systems in an objective, consistent, cost-effective manner.
As an example, after the September 11, 2001 attacks, the TSA (Transportation Security Administration) was created to be a coordinated

body which identified air travel security concerns and addressed those threats with consistent, effective, evenly applied security solutions and procedures, executed at all airports across the country. The school shooting crisis has not caused the creation of a centralized governing body to apply security measures consistently across the country. In fact, if airline security was addressed like we have the school shooting problem, we would have each airport across the country selecting the security technology they individually preferred the most. For example, some would have metal detectors, others would not; some would make you take your shoes off, others would let you keep your shoes on, yet take your liquids, but let you keep your laptop in your briefcase. It would end up being the most chaotic, inefficient and ineffective approach you could possibly come up with. Unfortunately, this inconsistent, unsystematic scenario, outlined above, resembles how we have responded to the school shooting crisis in the U.S.

The vision for improved school security going forward is to achieve the following objectives:

- Build a specialized, national school security association, with members from educational organizations and security companies, which would establish a construct whereby proven security solutions, knowledge and education would be made readily and consistently available to all educational institutions in need of them. This association would provide a similar function to schools as the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) serves the fire industry. For comparison, the following is a summary of the NFPA's mission statement: The mission of the international nonprofit NFPA, established in 1896,[1] is to reduce the worldwide burden of fire and other hazards on the quality of life by providing and advocating consensus codes and standards, research, training & education.
- Create a standardized approach for providing proven security systems and solutions for educational facilities that control and limit access of potential mass shooting assailants.
- Supply a standardized quantitative measurement tool to evaluate the vulnerability of schools consistently across the U.S.
- Generate an audit process which applies the standardized measurement tool to evaluate school facilities.
- Train and certify specialized school security experts in applying the audit process and installing the required security solutions to adhere to the minimum standard of school security requirements.

The Current State of School Security

An audit of school security preparedness across the U.S. will reveal an extensively diverse assortment of applications, methods and levels of vulnerability. These school shooting tragedies have unleashed a variety of responses from federal, state and local governments, as well as school officials, directed at increasing school security levels, to prevent future mass shootings. However, due to the fact that there has been no one, centralized governing or directing body created to achieve forward progress, the result has been that the decision-making progress to augment school security has largely been left to local school districts or, in the worst case scenario, individual schools themselves. Depending on the size and sophistication of the local school districts or schools in question, most do not employ a Chief Security Officer and therefore lack access to objective, sound advise and education regarding how best to protect their schools. In most schools, primarily K-12, the absence of a qualified security official, with budgeting and decision-making capabilities, achieves the effect of relegating the school security plan to already over-burdened administrators and or maintenance professional. The effect of all of this is that the process of measuring, evaluating, deciding upon and implementing school security improvements, has become a subjective, imprecise, inconsistent and most likely not optimally cost-effective process. Often times, local security companies are brought into the schools as advisors in order to increase school security. In some cases, this approach works when the selection of those security companies is objective and chooses a supplier with a broad array of integrated security systems which can address the unique situations and needs with regard to preventing unauthorized access by an unwanted intruder.

However, in most cases, school officials have no criteria to judge how effectively a security contractor can perform, in structuring a sound security plan of action for adequately protecting their school. There are no certified, specialized school security companies in existence today and no certification body to evaluate them on a consistent, measured basis. This lack of officially certified security provider companies has created a tremendous knowledge and expertise void, during the past year when schools across the U.S. have all been in desperate need of expertise in this arena. In the interest of taking action, most schools have subjectively enlisted help from outside security organization, without being able to count on any minimum standard of performance. This can be counterproductive for the following reasons:

1) The security professional chosen could specialize in a given area and not address the institution's needs in a holistic fashion. As an example, if the firm is exclusively a CCTV focused company, they could provide a security solution that's video camera centric, yet excludes critical components of access control, ballistic glass protection and visitor isolation man-traps.
2) An unbalanced security provider would yield an inefficient application of security solutions, thereby wasting valuable budget monies on improper, ineffective systems.
3) A worst-case scenario would be a security dealer who preys on the school's resources and price gauges while not providing adequate solutions.

The process of choosing a centralized, knowledgeable security consultant and installation company is extremely complicated, because of the many different facets and channels involved in providing the various different security products necessary in addressing the challenge of adequately protecting our country's schools. The security industry is not one unified industry. It is comprised of many different specialties, channels and operatives. The major segments and channels of the broader entity known as "the security industry" are as follows:

- ***Integrators*** – these are installers that typically specialize in and integrate higher-end access control, video, security alarm and other systems for their clients. They usually do not install locking hardware, although they often sub-contract this function outside and are increasingly integrating locking products with the access control system. These types of dealers will also integrate other systems, such as time and attendance, elevator control, etc., with the access control system. Rarely do they install fire alarms. These type of dealers are the closest thing to a "one stop shop" in the security industry.

- ***Security/ Fire Alarm Dealer*****s** – these professionals primarily install residential and commercial intrusion and fire alarms. Their main function is to provide alarm monitoring to their clients. They may install limited access control and video systems, but at a lower technical level and they do not usually provide a totally integrated solution. There are some higher-level security/ fire alarm dealers who may supply some integration of systems. They

rarely install, integrate and/or sub-contract the installation of locking hardware.

- ***CCTV Dealers*** – CCTV (closed circuit television) professionals install locally multiplexed and networked video camera and recording systems. They sometimes integrate these systems with other functions.

- ***Locksmiths/ Locking Professionals*** – these security professionals install all varieties of locking hardware, push bars, magnetic locks, strikes and standalone, electronic access control locks. With the advent of wirelessly networked electronic locks, they can install low to mid-level access control systems, but do not provide integration with other systems.

There is an additional layer of complexity in that some schools have internal employees order certain security components from distributors and install those themselves (ie., simple locks, standalone electronic locks) that may not provide a platform for integration with other systems.

No statistics exist on what percentage of and how many schools have improved their respective security levels across America. Directionally speaking, obviously many schools have made substantial improvements. However, there are no quantitative measurements on how effectively these institutions have made themselves less vulnerable to unwanted access by an active shooter.

Qualitatively speaking, and informally gauging activity during the past year, some schools have enhanced classroom locks, others have installed ballistic glass on exterior doors, yet others have installed more video monitoring. Additionally, some schools have enhanced their control of access by visitors during school hours. However, it is uncommon to see schools, particularly in small districts, whereby a methodical standardized approach has been taken in using state-of-the–art security solutions, available today, to absolutely guarantee with a high degree of certainty that no unwanted intruders will gain access to the school.

The tools currently exist whereby a school, without seeming prison-like, can now control access through one single, bullet-proof entry point, evaluate visitors while they are still outside of the school, then have them enter a man-

trap, bullet-proof vestibule where their identification and possessions are scrutinized and then are granted access to the school's administrative offices. Once inside the administrative offices, a visitor would still be greeted with high technology locks at each of the individual classrooms as yet another access control point. To reach a classroom, under this system, a visitor would have to be granted physical access at four (4) different points to reach a classroom. If so desired, the school can be sectioned off into wings, to further control and deter access, if needed. At each stage of this process, panic alarms can be set off to alert the school as well as authorities of an intrusion. Video monitoring can be layered on via video cameras, to guide law enforcement officers in real-time management of an event, if warranted.

The knowledge base and solutions currently exist to prevent access by an active shooter to a school. The problem lies in disseminating this information, education and expertise to school decision-makers in an objective, legitimate, standardized manner, by certified, highly competent security practitioners. Obviously, school budgets in many cases are limited. This method would strive to supply the most cost-effective security solutions on the market today.

Chronology of a Mass Shooting with Corresponding Security Countermeasures

An attack from a mass shooter can happen at any time during the school day. It is most difficult to control access to the school when students are arriving in the morning and leaving at the end of the school day, since a large volume of people are entering all at once. In most K-12 schools, picture identifications are not needed to enter the school at the beginning and end of the day. The chronology outlined below, will describe how to enhance the protection of the school, while class is in session and the facility is controlling access from outside visitors.

Possible intruder approaches school – when a mass shooter attempts an attack at a school, the objective is, typically, to gain access to the facility with weapons and ammunition. During school hours the assailant can approach the school in several ways.

1) Try to gain access via the front entrance
2) Enter through side entrances
3) Attempt entry through a window.

A sound security plan designs for the flow of visitors to enter through one central entrance. At the front of the school all perimeter fencing is of a anti-climb nature and routes everyone away from the side windows and doors of the facility and in through the main entryway.

When the intruder approaches the school the anti-climb fencing re-routes them to the front of the school and if he/she attempts to get in through a side door, those are locked, protected by anti-ballistic glass and monitored so that they go into alarm if they are propped open, for entry at a later time.
At this point the attacker has no choice, but to approach the school by the main entrance.

Front entrance access - when approaching the facility, during times when class is in session, the intruder would be faced with a door that has an access control magnet or strike controlling entry, fitted with anti-ballistic glass, so it cannot be defeated by gun fire and the visitor has to reveal their purpose via a video intercom system to security.

Visitor management vestibule - assuming all seems OK with a visitor that is scrutinized at the front door, the potential intruder would be granted access into a vestibule area, otherwise known as a man-trap, to have his/her identification checked by security personnel. The security personnel would interact with the visitor via a window, equipped with anti-ballistic glass, to prevent forcible entry. The visitor is now contained in a trap between two doors and cannot exit or enter without being granted either action by security officials. It is important to note, that at this point the identification vetting process is being done in total isolation and with lack of access to the rest of the school.

Access to administrative offices - assuming that all is well with the identification process, the visitor or potential attacker is now granted access to the next level of security in the school; the administration office. If a shooter is somehow inadvertently or errantly granted access, with a firearm, the assailant would still be prevented from entering the rest of the school. The administrative office should be separated from the rest of the school by an additional access point.

Inner school corridor access - after gaining authorization at the administrative offices, the visitor is then granted access to the inner corridors of the school. Naturally, if the visitor has been vetted out in the offices, he/she is not carrying any visible weapons or ammunition and has not initiated any hostile activities. However, after granting the visitor access to inner school corridors, the security plan should still call for access control to classrooms, as weapons and ammunition could have previously been hidden for retrieval, for use during this access event and/or the intruder could be working with an accomplice attempting to physically enter the facility from another exterior entry point. Round the clock, 24/7 security is needed at schools to prevent a person from hiding weapons and ammunition in the facility during off-hours at the school. Exterior measures, such as anti-climb fences to schoolyards and non-primary, exterior doors protected by anti-ballistic glass and door position alarms (to keep doors from being propped open from the inside) all would limit the feasibility of these scenarios being successful, in granting access to an intruder with a firearm and ammunition.

Access to classrooms – it is a matter of school policy as to whether or not classroom doors should closed and locked when teachers are conducting classroom sessions. There are valid arguments to support both positions. The security plan should support both schools of thought. Assuming an active shooter has somehow defeated the previously outlined layers of access control and gained access to the inner corridors of the facility and is now menacing the classrooms, the following counter measures should be in place: 1) Intruder locks of some sort should be present on classroom doors. These locks are unique in that they can be locked by a school official from the inside of the classroom and they do not require a user to walk into the hallway to operate. 2) Electronic intruder locks are the next level of protection in that some operate with an interior button which achieves lock-down quicker or other varieties can be locked down wirelessly via key-fob or stationary button, while away from the classroom door. 3) Finally, the next highest level of electronic locks in a school facility are capable of being networked together so that they all communicate with each other. This networking feature allows any authorized teacher or school administrator to approach ANY networked lock in the facility, enter a code or activate a key fob and lock down ALL classroom locks in a school. The thinking behind this is that it multiplies the “eyes and ears” in a facility and deputizes a number of teachers and administrators in being able to initiate a global lock down, should a security threat develop. When locking down a classroom, another necessary security

measure is the ability for the teacher to be able to lower shades/ draw blinds on classroom doors and exterior or interior windows.

Emergency notification and lock-down – The security plan entails the ability to notify police and/or lock-down the school during any stage of the access control process. If an intruder begins an attack when approaching any stage of access; 1) At the external video intercom 2) Having his/her identification checked while inside the man-trap 3) When in the administrative offices, or 4) Inside the inner hallways and classrooms, panic buttons can be activated at any stage to summon law enforcement. Also, a school lock-down can be initiated at any of the aforementioned stages of access. Some municipalities have the ability to connect the school's lock-down alarm directly to law enforcement authorities. This is preferable, versus routing the signal through a third-party central station.

Real-time video monitoring – An additional security measure which helps greatly to mitigate the progress of an active shooter, once encountered, is the ability to monitor the school via video cameras, on a real-time basis, as the event is unfolding. This system, coupled with an up-to-date floor plan of the facility, enables police to remotely monitor the whereabouts of the shooter and develop a plan of action accordingly. The objective here is to quickly and severely limit the scope of casualties, by gathering intelligence on where to intercept the assailant.

Introduction of School Access-Control Vulnerability Index (S.A.V.I), Audit and Certification Process

This white paper introduces the *School Access-Control Vulnerability Index (S.A.V.I.)*, Audit and Dealer Certification process. The index measures the presence, or lack thereof, of specialized systems and structures aimed at severely limiting the possibility of an active shooter gaining access to a school. The index brings together input from a variety of general and school security experts across the U.S.

The S.A.V.I. index can be used to administer the S.A.V.I. Audit process whereby the school facility is quantitatively scored on how susceptible the facility would be to a mass shooting attack. The audit measures the efficacy of how well the total group of security systems and structures work together in blocking access to the school, by an unwanted intruder.

A dedicated school security body or association would be responsible for evaluating how well the proposed S.A.V.I. security systems outline stands up to real-world experience and, subsequently evolve or modify the model, as needed. This school security association would also construct a Dealer Certification Process, whereby security integrators would be trained and certified on how to audit facilities and install required, cost-effective, specialized, approved school-specific security measures.

The S.A.V.I. index audits the presence of specific security measures such as anti-climb mesh fencing, entryway access-control technology, high security visitor management vestibule areas, intruder door locks, ballistic glass, panic alarms and much more. The objective is to control ingress into the main entryway of the school and then control further access throughout the school in progressive stages. Should there be any concern at each stage of access to the facility, access through the respective entryway is physically denied. At each stage of access control, if an event occurs, panic alarms are available to summon police, in order to achieve the quickest response time possible.
The S.A.V.I. index is broken up into three separate categories:

1) Exterior Protection
2) Interior Protection
3) Interior Locking

The overall security strategy in protecting a school facility is to route all vehicular traffic and pedestrian entry into one singular access point. All access to perimeter exterior doors and to classroom windows and/or adjacent fields needs to be controlled by the use of anti-climb fencing and perimeter door locks. Door position switches need to be employed on perimeter doors so they cannot be propped open to provide ingress at a later time. From the main entry, when school is in session, visitors will be granted or denied access at 4 different points until they are able to reach a classroom.

1) When entering the exterior front door they will be evaluated via video intercom and granted or denied access to the identification vestibule "man-trap".
2) Once in the vestibule, with doors on both sides, identification will be vetted out and access will be granted or denied to the administrative office.
3) If further access is needed beyond the administrative office, access will be granted or denied to the interior hallways of the school.
4) Once in the school hallways, classroom doors may be locked to prevent further access.

The S.A.V.I. index worksheet model, requires the auditor to check off, in the affirmative, if certain security systems and structures are in place at the school facility and in working condition. Each system or structure in place is scored with a weighted percentage. The professional conducting the audit works their way through the index worksheet to completion. When automatically tallied, the electronic worksheet will provide a quantitative score of how well the school is able to thwart unwanted access. A score of 75% or higher reflects a high level of access control security at the facility. Anything below 75% will show up in "red" on the worksheet and will signify that a key component in protecting the school has been left out of the security plan.

The S.A.V.I. index worksheet, shown on the next page, includes an example of a school security evaluation & score:

School Access-Control Vulnerability Index

Facility Name:	Main Street Middle School
Address:	Main Street, USA
Security Auditor:	ABC Integrators
Audit Date:	January 18, 2018

Security Criteria	Index Weighting	Condition Met?	Index Score
Exterior Protection			
Impenetrable or bullet-proof glass front perimeter door	5%		
Front perimeter entrance equipped with wired electronic access control system with electric strike lock - lock-down capable	10%	YES	10%
All perimeter doors equipped with door position switch (to prevent propping open) which can be centrally monitored	5%	YES	5%
Anti-scalable exterior fences and locked gates. One entryway into main entrance.	5%		
Ballistic plastic window glazing on all perimeter doors	5%		
School hours video intercom system to grant access	5%	YES	5%
High security door locks on all exterior doors, preventing key duplication	5%	YES	5%
Interior Protection			
Vestibule with two access points: 1) To main check-in point (no school access) 2) School access, locked at all times.	10%	YES	10%
Guard / personnel manned ID verification/ visitor management	10%	YES	10%
Administrative office panic alarm - central station or police monitored	5%	YES	5%
Ability to "Go Live" to monitor hallway activity with video cameras	10%	YES	10%
Blinds on windows/doors to block potential active shooter's view	5%		
Interior Locking	⇩	select just one ⇩	
Lockable door locks on all classrooms.	10%		
Intruder locks on all classrooms, capable of being locked-down from the inside	15%		
Electronic door locks on all classrooms, capable of being locked-down from the inside protected room	15%		
Electronic door locks on all classrooms, capable of being locked-down by authorized personnel from anywhere in the classroom- Wireless Button	20%		
Wireless electronic locks on all classrooms, capable of all being locked-down globally from administrative offices and/or any authorized teacher/personnel, at any lock	25%	YES	25%
SAVI Index Rating for Main Street Middle School			**85%**

The Desired State of School Security

Implementation of the recommendations in this white paper would transform the level of security and protection present in U.S. schools.

A summary of improvements is listed below.

1) *School Security Professionals Association* - An association would exist which brings together, on a national basis, education officials, security companies and integrators, to begin to create a proven standard for effective security measures to be implemented at educational facilities. This association would create, leverage and consolidate the school specific security knowledge base and share it across all school districts, however large or small, or adequately or poorly funded. This association would facilitate the objective dissemination of information on the most advanced, cost-effective security techniques and systems throughout the educational community. It would also serve as a clearing house for learning from mass shooting events, over time, and provide an organic structure which improves and refines security counter-measures. The association would also create a formalized, professional certification process for training installation companies in addressing the needed security measures needed, which are unique to the education application and address the vulnerability to active shooter attacks. This organization could also provide a cooperative structure to procure security systems on a national basis at the most cost-effective levels possible, thereby stretching valuable budget monies.

2) *S.A.V.I. Certified School Security Integrator* – The SSPA would train, evaluate and certify dealer/installation companies educated in the proper administration of a S.A.V.I Audit and the installation of recommended school application specific security counter-measures.

3) *School Access-Control Vulnerability Index (S.A.V.I) Index and Audit Process* – The S.A.V.I. index and Audit Process would be administered by a SSPA Certified security integrator. School administrative personnel would source a SSPA Certified Dealer and have them audit

their facility using the S.A.V.I. model. This model scores the school on the presence of recommended security systems and structures which have been proven to mitigate the access by an active shooter to a facility. The score needs to be over 75% to “pass” the school. The S.A.V.I. Index and Audit Process would be updated, enhanced or improved, by the SSPA, given new learning, as real-life experience would dictate.

Footnotes:

[ii] Klein, Jessie, (2012).*The Bully Society,School Shootings and the Crisis of Bullying in America's Schools*, New York University Press, New York and London

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NOTE:

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